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Artificial Intelligence in Canadian Healthcare:
Will the Law Protect Us from Algorithmic Bias
Resulting in Discrimination?
Bradley Henderson, Colleen M. Flood & Teresa Scassa*

INTRODUCTION
Many hope that artificial intelligence (AI) will transform healthcare systems
by improving clinical outcomes, efficiency, safety, and quality, as well as access
to care (e.g., reducing wait times, improving the speed of diagnoses, and
permitting the delivery of highly specialized care like robotic surgery in remote
and rural areas).1 AI may also help improve upon existing high rates of avoidable
medical errors2 and help healthcare providers automate many administrative
tasks that distract them from patient care. However, the introduction of AI in
healthcare has also raised concerns, with perhaps the most pressing among them
being that AI could perpetuate or exacerbate existing bias and discrimination
problems. On the face of it, one might hope that the introduction of AI
algorithms would enhance objectivity in clinical decision-making by
counteracting human biases known to result in differential treatment on
prohibited grounds of discrimination, including on the basis of race, sex, and
sexual orientation.3 However, because AI is built by innovators with their own
biases and/or upon data sets that may reflect pre-existing biases and inequalities, 4
there is a danger that AI, at least in some cases, will instead perpetuate or even
*
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this article.
See Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada, Task Force Report on Artificial
Intelligence and Emerging Digital Technologies (Ottawa: Royal College of Physicians and
Surgeons of Canada, 2020) at 34 [Task Force].
See G Ross Baker et al, “The Canadian Adverse Events Study: The Incidence of Adverse
Events Among Hospital Patients in Canada” (2004) 170:11 CMAJ 1678 at 1683-85. See
also Fei Jiang et al, “Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare: Past, Present and Future”
(2017) 2:4 Stroke & Vascular Neurology 230 at 230 [Jiang].
See Ravi B Parikh, Stephanie Teeple & Amol S Navathe, “Addressing Bias in Artificial
Intelligence in Health Care” (2019) 322:24 JAMA 2377 at 2378 [Parikh].
See Robert Challen et al, “Artificial Intelligence, Bias and Clinical Safety” (2019) 28:3
BMJ Quality & Safety 231 at 232-35.

476 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[19 C.J.L.T.]

worsen existing discrimination within healthcare. Addressing this concern is
essential so that the benefits of healthcare-related AI are not realized at the
expense of perpetuating or increasing discrimination (whether direct or indirect)
against marginalized groups.
The term ‘‘algorithmic bias” is generally used in the literature to refer to an
unwarranted skewing of outputs because of a problem in the algorithmic design.
It is also closely related to ‘‘data bias,” where the data that the algorithm is built
upon or uses is skewed in an unwarranted way. In this article we are concerned
with algorithmic and data bias resulting in healthcare-related AI applications
that treat groups or individuals differently on the basis of arbitrary traits, such as
race or sex, with no clinical, moral, or legal justification. So understood,
algorithmic and data bias result in the legal and moral concept of wrongful
discrimination. This form of injustice can be intentional or unintentional, and its
effects can be individualized or systemic. Unintentional and systemic
discrimination may occur where an AI application makes recommendations
based on arbitrary factors such as race or gender. These recommendations can
have adverse effects for patients and/or exacerbate existing inequalities. 5
Legal and moral responsibility for addressing these risks extends beyond the
AI innovators who create AI algorithms. Before licensing their use, as we discuss
below, regulators have an obligation to scrutinize healthcare-related AI health
applications and the data sources upon which they are trained, to detect their
limitations or embedded biases and, at a minimum, ensure that concerns are
communicated to health professionals and affected patients.
In this article, we canvas why AI may perpetuate or exacerbate extant
discrimination through a review of the training, development, and
implementation of healthcare-related AI applications and set out policy
options to militate against such discrimination. The article is divided into eight
short parts including this introduction. Part II focuses on explaining AI, some of
its basic functions and processes, and its relevance to healthcare. In Part III, we
define and explain the difference and relationship between algorithmic bias and
data bias, both of which can result in discrimination in healthcare settings, and
provide some prominent examples of healthcare-related AI applications that
have resulted in discrimination or have produced discriminatory outputs. Part IV
explains in more detail differences between algorithmic bias and data bias, with a
focus on data bias and data governance, including the non-representativeness of
data sets used in training AI. From this point we turn to look at possible legal
responses to the problem of algorithmic discrimination, and, in Part V, we
demonstrate the insufficiency of existing ex post legal protections (i.e., legal
protections that offer redress after someone has suffered harm), including claims
in negligence, under human rights legislation, and under the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms.6 Part VI explores possibilities within the Canadian ex ante legal
5

See the discussion on adverse impact discrimination in Fraser v. Canada (Attorney
General), 2020 SCC 28, 2020 CarswellNat 4333, 2020 CarswellNat 4334 (S.C.C.) at
paras. 30, 50.
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landscape (i.e., the regulation of AI applications before they become available for
use in healthcare settings), notably through federal regulation of medical devices,
and identifies gaps in oversight. Finally, in Part VII we provide
recommendations for federal and provincial governments and innovators as to
the appropriate governance and regulatory approach to counter algorithmic and
data bias that results in discrimination in healthcare-related AI, before
concluding in Part VIII.

1. HEALTHCARE-RELATED AI APPLICATIONS7
AI has been broadly defined as ‘‘intelligent computer programs” capable of
undertaking higher-order tasks associated with intelligent beings, such as making
complex predictions or recommendations.8 For the purpose of this article, we are
concerned with ‘‘narrow” AI — that is to say, AI that performs specific tasks or
seeks to achieve specific goals within a set of pre-determined parameters. For
example, narrow AI could support healthcare practitioners or system managers
in solving a specific problem based on certain inputs (e.g., diagnostic images) or
in identifying new patterns.9 ‘‘General AI,” or AI that can define and seek to
achieve its own tasks and goals beyond pre-defined parameters, similar to the
human mind, does not yet exist.10 This type of AI could include, for example, a
fully-automated healthcare provider capable of identifying novel problems,
categorizing them, connecting them to relevant information, and applying its
decision-making processes to implement solutions.
In healthcare, ‘‘machine learning” (ML) is a common form of narrow AI
that may, for example, seek to optimize workflow or predict the results of
diagnostic imaging.11 AI involves mathematical and statistical analysis.12 ML
6

7
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Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 15, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
AI applications do and will have a much broader reach beyond healthcare and into
public health, but for reasons of scope and the length of this article we primarily confine
our analyses to issues of algorithmic/data bias and discrimination resulting therefrom.
See World Health Organization, Ethics and governance for artificial intelligence for
health: WHO guidance (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2021) at 4 [WHO
Guidance]; see also Task Force, supra note 1 at 14; see also Timo Minssen et al,
‘‘Regulatory Responses to Medical Machine Learning” (2020) 7:1 JL & Biosciences 1 at 2
[Minssen].
See Bertalan Mesko, “The Role of Artificial Intelligence in Precision Medicine” (2017)
2:5 Expert Rev Precision Medicine & Drug Development 239 at 240.
See Erik R Ranschaert et al, “Advantages, Challenges, and Risks of Artificial
Intelligence for Radiologists” in Erik R Ranschaert, Sergey Morozov & Paul Algra,
eds, Artificial Intelligence in Medical Imaging: Opportunities, Applications and Risks
(Switzerland: Springer, 2019) 329 at 330.
Sarah Gerke, Timo Minssen & Glenn Cohen, ‘‘Ethical and Legal Challenges of Artificial
Intelligence-Driven Healthcare” (2020) Academic Press 295 at 295 [Gerke]. See also,
generally, Weicheng Kuo et al “Expert-Level Detection of Acute Intracranial
Hemorrhage on Head Computed Tomography Using Deep Learning” (2019) 116:45
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takes this one step further — it often involves neural networks and deep learning
such that AI can ‘‘learn” from its training data. Neural networks are an
interconnected array of nodes consisting of, at a minimum, an input layer and an
output layer. Each node is, generally, assigned a weight, which mathematically
and statistically analyzes an input to convey an output.13 The many connections
between these nodes creates the ‘‘network.” Deep learning involves a neural
network with multiple hidden layers between the input and output layers for
more extensive analysis,14 rendering the algorithm’s functions less transparent.
Complex, highly obscure algorithms are often referred to as ‘‘black boxes“ 15 and
raise questions about the extent to which humans are able to supervise or oversee
their operations.
AI developers, through a process called supervised learning,16 use large data
sets to ‘‘train” an algorithm by mapping the training data (i.e., inputs) to specific
‘‘successful“ outputs or goals. During this process, the developer defines a list of
features for the AI application to analyze, and they may assign weights to those
features, or leave the initial assignment of weights for some or all features to
random chance. The AIML application may then continuously adjust and
optimize, including by adjusting its weighting of features, by learning from its
training data. Deep learning, again, takes this one step further: the algorithm
defines the features where they are less certain. Overall, this process generates the
algorithm’s map or ‘‘label,”17 (i.e., its set of rules that will analyze new inputs and
predict outputs or outcomes). Notably, a developer may not always fully
understand an algorithm’s rules, especially where the algorithm is a ‘‘black box,”
since they are a combination of the developer’s programming (e.g., feature
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13
14

15

16
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Proceedings National Academy Sciences 22737, as well as Andre Esteva et al,
“Dermatologist-Level Classification of Skin Cancer with Deep Neural Networks”
(2017) 542:7639 Nature 115, for examples of AI applications in clinical practice,
including software that assists healthcare professionals in more accurately diagnosing
skin cancer and strokes.
Hooman H Rashidi et al, “Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in Pathology:
The Present Landscape of Supervised Methods” (2019) 6 Academic Pathology 1 at 9
[Rashidi].
Task Force, supra note 1 at 14.
See Yann LeCunn, Yoshua Bengio & Geoffrey Hinton, ‘‘Deep Learning” (2015)
521:7553 Nature 436 at 436-38.
See Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London,
England: Harvard University Press, 2015) [Pasquale].
In addition to supervised learning, AI developers may use unsupervised learning
(clustering) to train an algorithm to identify commonalities in unorganized data. AI
developers may also use reinforcement learning, whereby an algorithm is trained to learn
a sequence of events based on its environment. See Rashidi, supra note 12 at 8.
In the context of AI, we refer to a ‘‘label” as meaning an AI application’s ‘‘process map”
between inputs and outputs, as derived through its training and labelling of data. For
example, an AIML application trained to detect skin cancer will create a process map to
predict the probability of a cancerous lesion when it is provided a new input image.
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selection and defined goals) and the algorithm’s mathematical and statistical
processes as derived from its training. Importantly, after training, validating, and
testing an algorithm, a developer may ‘‘lock” the algorithm, or they may leave it
‘‘unlocked“ such that it can continually ‘‘adapt.” Adaptive AIML is capable of
learning not only from its training data, but from new input data in real-world
settings, within its parameters, to continuously learn and self-optimize. 18
An adaptive AIML application’s continuous learning and self-optimizing
may improve its safety and efficacy for some patients, possibly by reducing
algorithmic bias if it is exposed to a diversity of patients, but the opposite may
also hold true — especially for patients or patient populations on whom an AI
application is used less frequently. Notably, developers may see feedback loop
effects whereby an adaptive AIML application becomes increasingly optimized
for data that it is exposed to at greater frequencies.19 This raises complex
bioethical questions including whether highly beneficial AIML applications
should be allowed to learn in real time where their training data is limited. In
such cases, patients who are not well represented in an adaptive AIML
application’s training data would likely bear greater safety risks and risk of
discrimination.
While adaptive AIML applications in healthcare are under development,
many non-adaptive AI and AIML applications are being tested or have been
implemented in healthcare. Prominent types of healthcare-related AI
applications include those that identify and classify skin cancers, restore the
control of movement in patients with neurological conditions, and diagnose
cardiac conditions.20 The importance of early diagnosis and treatment in these
therapeutic areas to prevent death and disease deterioration21 has also likely
spurred development of AI applications that apply at multiple stages of care,
such as in detecting and diagnosing strokes, predicting the effectiveness of
treatments, and predicting disease prognosis. 22 Healthcare-related AI
applications also extend beyond clinician tools and include use for setting
priorities within healthcare systems and other patient-level and data analytics
applications.23
While healthcare-related AI applications are rapidly expanding and
advancing, the features used as inputs often include common patient traits,
such as symptoms, test results, comorbidities, age, gender, and race. 24 Generally,
18
19

20
21
22
23

24

See Minssen, supra note 8 at 2.
See James Zou & Londa Schiebinger, “AI Can Be Sexist and Racist — It’s Time to Make
It Fair” (2018) 559 Nature 324 at 325 [Zou].
See Jiang, supra note 2 at 231.
Ibid.
Ibid. at 239-40.
See Eric J Topol, “High-Performance Medicine: The Convergence of Human and
Artificial Intelligence” (2019) 25:1 Nature Medicine 44 [Topol].
See Jiang, supra note 2 at 232.

480 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[19 C.J.L.T.]

the greater the number of patient traits, and the larger the quantity of other
available information, the greater the ability of a developer to train an algorithm
to recognize concealed patterns, learn from outliers, and tailor itself to a greater
number of subsets of individuals or patient groups (therefore reducing the
likelihood of discrimination caused by the algorithm itself). However, training
data is often fraught with bias, which, left unmitigated, could result in
discrimination in, for example, treatment decisions vis-à-vis marginalized
patients. And importantly, many patients’ traits map onto prohibited grounds
of discrimination under federal and provincial human rights legislation. 25 Below,
we explore whether and to what extent the problem of algorithmic bias, resulting
in discrimination, can be counteracted — whether ex ante (e.g., by working
upstream to mitigate bias in training data) or ex post (e.g., through litigation by
individuals and groups who have experienced discrimination).

2. MULTIPLE SOURCES OF BIAS ARE LIKELY TO ARISE IN THE
DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF AI APPLICATIONS IN
HEALTHCARE
To better understand healthcare-related AI bias, we can distinguish between
two often interrelated kinds of bias with two subsets therein. The first is
algorithmic bias, which includes coding bias that is introduced, even if
unconsciously, by a developer during an AI application’s development, as well
as AIML that itself “learns” over time to be biased. The second is biased data
with two sources of bias of most concern: (a) training on non-representative data
(i.e., data that is not properly representative of the range of possible patients),
and (b) data bias resulting from the fact that available data is derived from
systems that are biased in terms of access, diagnosis, and treatment of
marginalized groups. We discuss these further below but also note here that
beyond the scope of this article are other sources of bias that could result in
healthcare-related AI discrimination such as inherent bias from new inputs (e.g.,
inaccuracies in existing medical devices for specific populations) 26 and the
interpretation of an AI application’s output(s) (e.g., giving too much deference to
an AI application’s output, which is known as automation complacency or
automation bias).27

(a) Algorithmic Bias (Coding Bias & Machine Learning Bias)
Coding bias may result from a developer’s weighting of an AI application’s
features or in their defining the AI application’s definition of ‘‘success.” 28 These
25

26

27
28

See e.g. Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6; see also e.g. Human Rights Code,
RSO 1990, c H.19.
See Michael W Sjoding et al, “Racial Bias in Pulse Oximetry Measurement” (2020)
383:25 New Eng J Med 2477.
See Parikh, supra note 3 at 2377.
See Minssen, supra note 8 at 16. See also Davide Cirillo et al, “Sex and Gender
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sources of bias may result from developers of AI applications inappropriately
selecting proxy features during their development. Proxy features are those that
an AI application uses as a surrogate to predict its ‘‘goal,“ for example, where an
AI application uses a patient’s socio-economic class to predict their risk of future
cardiomyopathy. In the case of adaptive AIML, sometimes the algorithm is
coded fine, but it makes its own inferences while it learns in order to produce an
output (i.e., a social or medical construct, or ‘‘definition of success”), such as
creditworthiness, risk of future cardiac disease based on genetic predispositions,
or healthcare need. Algorithmic bias arises where we expect an AI application to
tell us one thing, but it is actually telling us something else, especially for different
groups.29 For example, this could occur where an AI application uses postal
codes to infer socio-economic class and predict patients’ risk of future
cardiomyopathy: the AI application may score two patients with identical postal
codes the same, even though they may have drastically different healthcare needs
and risk factors. This form of algorithmic bias then may result in discrimination
in the diagnosis and treatment of marginalized patients. Other sources of
algorithmic bias that can result in discrimination include choices as to how the
algorithm is tested and validated.

(b) Data Bias
(i) Non-representative Training Data
Non-representative training data are overly homogenous data sets that do
not adequately reflect the intended or likely patient population that will be
treated using the AI application, or data sets that deliberately or inadvertently
exclude significant subpopulations or relevant traits of an intended or likely
patient population. For example, homogenous data sets may introduce
contextual bias: if an AI application is designed using data from a highincome area, it may be less accurate when used in a low-income area30 and fail to
account for contextual factors such as significant differences in the rates of
prescription drug coverage or access to paid sick leave. Contextual bias may also
be introduced during the validation and testing of an AI application — to which
some have suggested requiring cross-contextual validation and testing in multiple
settings (e.g., different geographic regions with varying demographics). 31
Further, where an AI application is trained on data from a specific

29

30
31

Differences and Biases in Artificial Intelligence for Biomedicine and Healthcare” (2020)
3:1 NPJ Digital Medicine 1 at 4 [Cirillo].
See Ziad Obermeyer et al, ‘‘Algorithmic Bias Playbook” (2021) at 1, online (pdf):
Chicago Booth: The Centre for Applied Artificial Intelligence <www.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/project/chicago-booth/centers/caai/docs/algorithmic-bias-playbook-june2021.pdf> [Obermeyer, ‘‘Algorithmic Bias Playbook”].
See Minssen, supra note 8 at 17.
See W Nicholson Price II, “Medical AI and Contextual Bias” (2019) 33:1 Harv JL & Tech
66 at 109-10.
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subpopulation, for example, data that is predominantly White and male, the AI
may be less accurate for other subpopulations with distinct considerations,
contextual factors, or healthcare needs.
It follows that high quality and accurate AI applications in healthcare
require robust, reliable, valid, and heterogeneous training data. 32 Unfortunately,
many accessible data sets currently used to train AI applications in healthcare are
relatively racially, geographically, or socio-economically homogenous 33 and
therefore fail to adequately represent many vulnerable and marginalized patient
populations. For example, MIMIC-III is a large, commonly used, publicly
available database for the development of AI applications in adult critical care. 34
It provides critical care data from a large tertiary care hospital in Boston,
Massachusetts.35 In this example, an AI application derived from MIMIC-III
data could be biased in favour of the socio-economically advantaged who were
able to access such care, and against other patient subpopulations. We need to
consider the generalizability of AI applications trained on its data to Canadian
patients in rural areas,36 Indigenous populations, racially diverse communities,
lower income communities, or other communities (or patient subpopulations).
Narrow, homogenous data increases the likelihood that an AI application
will better optimize successful outputs for well represented subpopulations
compared to less represented subpopulations, including marginalized and
vulnerable individuals. Prominent examples include some image-analyzing
algorithms in dermatology that produce less accurate results for Black patients
compared to White patients,37 potentially compounding existing inequalities in
skin cancer survival rates between these patient groups.38 Similarly, some
thoracic imaging-analyzing algorithms produce less accurate results for women
— whose sex was underrepresented in the AI application’s training data,
32
33

34

35

36
37

38

See Gerke, supra note 11 at 302.
See Sujay Nagaraj et al, “From Clinic to Computer and Back Again: Practical
Considerations When Designing and Implementing Machine Learning Solutions for
Pediatrics” (2020) 6 Current Treatment Options in Pediatrics 336 at 339 [Nagaraj].
Further, genetics research, for example, has historically been carried out on populations
of European decent; see also Amy R Bentley, Shawneequa Callier & Charles N Rotimi,
“Diversity and Inclusion in Genomic Research: Why the Uneven Progress?” (2017) 8:4 J
Community Genetics 255 at 259. Biomedical research has, historically, failed to
adequately include female patients and to account for gender-related physiological
differences, see Cirillo, supra note 28 at 2.
See Nagaraj, supra note 33 at 339. MIMIC-III has been used in the development of over
1300 AI applications in adult critical care.
See Alistair EW Johnson et al, “MIMIC-III, a Freely Accessible Critical Care Database”
(2016) 3:1 Scientific Data 1.
See Nagaraj, supra note 33 at 344.
See Adewole S Adamson & Avery Smith, “Machine Learning and Health Care
Disparities in Dermatology” (2018) 154:11 J American Medical Assoc 1247 [Adamson].
Ibid; see also Janice N Cormier et al, ‘‘Ethnic Differences Among Patients with
Cutaneous Melanoma” (2006) 166 Archives Internal Medicine 1907.
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compounding existing inequalities in cardio-thoracic diagnoses and treatments
between sexes.39 More recently, COVID-19 prompted a flood of new AI
applications to provide insights into its clinical management, prevention, and
disease severity likelihoods for certain patient populations, e.g., those with
specific comorbidities.40 Yet, one study that examined 226 COVID-19 AI models
found that 97% were a high risk of bias, and with 42% of those the risk sprang
from the fact that the training data was not representative of the intended patient
population.41
Even assuming that representative data is available in principle, there is a
separate risk that it might be curated42 to such an extent that it becomes nonrepresentative of certain patient subpopulations and therefore fails to account for
real-world variables.43 This is a concern, for example, where patients’ traits in
training data are limited to age, gender, and postal code, possibly due to their
availability or accessibility. Race or ethnicity data may not be readily available
but is needed to increase the accuracy of AIML applications.

(c) Upstream Data Bias
The masking of upstream data bias, and its subsequent incorporation into an
algorithm’s ‘‘label,”44 may result from ongoing structural inequalities or from
reliance on data that reflects outdated or discriminatory norms. 45 Consider, for
example, a natural language processing application trained on two decades of
physician notes, which have since been structured for the development of an
AIML application. Such an application would likely produce less accurate
results for non-binary and gender non-conforming individuals, considering the
dominant historical use of the pronouns ‘‘he” and ‘‘she,” as well as their use on,
for example, patient intake forms. Also consider an AI application that uses
39

40

41

42

43
44

45

Agostina J Larrazabal et al, “Gender Imbalance in Medical Imaging Datasets Produces
Biased Classifiers for Computer-Aided Diagnosis” (2020) 117:23 Proceedings National
Academy Sciences 12592.
Casey Ross, ‘‘Machine Learning is Booming in Medicine. It’s also Facing a Credibility
Crisis” (2 June 2021), online: Stat News <www.statnews.com/2021/06/02/machinelearning-ai-methodology-research-flaws/>.
Laure Wynants et al, “Prediction Models for Diagnosis and Prognosis of Covid-19:
Systematic Review and Critical Appraisal” (2021) 369 BMJ 1 at 6.
Curating data involves the formatting, organizing, labelling, etc., of data. Highly curated
data may advertently or inadvertently exclude important information such as certain
patient features or other patient data that is incomplete. Further, the curating process
itself can also introduce bias through, for example, the inappropriate labelling of data.
See Rashidi, supra note 12 at 2.
See Ziad Obermeyer et al, “Dissecting Racial Bias in an Algorithm Used to Manage the
Health of Populations” (2019) 366:6464 Science 447 at 453 [Obermeyer, ‘‘Dissecting
Racial Bias”].
See Noel Sharkey, ‘‘The Impact of Gender and Race Bias in AI” (28 August 2018), online
(blog): Humanitarian Law & Policy <blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2018/08/28/impactgender-race-bias-ai/>.
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frequency of healthcare visits as a proxy for disease progression in different
patient populations. Without other important information, disparities in
healthcare accessibility between groups that are entrenched in data sets would
likely result in biased outputs.
Some data sets used to train healthcare-related AI applications have reflected
existing systemic issues in healthcare, thus replicating these problems in those AI
applications’ outputs. For example, in the US, Epic Systems Inc. developed a
predictive ‘‘no-show” model whereby facilities could double book patients
deemed a high ‘‘no-show” risk to maximize clinical bookings. 46 However, if both
patients showed up for their appointments, then each patient would be more
likely to receive less care, in terms of time. This model generated predictive ‘‘noshow” values using information from patients’ electronic health records,
including ethnicity and socioeconomic class. And even when the implementing
facility excluded these variables, the model still generated biased predictive values
based solely on the levels of past healthcare access. The model failed to account
for implicit discrimination in access to healthcare by different groups and,
therefore, was more likely to double book already marginalized patients and
further reduce their level of care.
Another US study, on a separate AI application in healthcare, found similar
outcomes.47 Like Epic’s ‘‘no-show” model, this AI application’s algorithm failed
to account for unequal access to healthcare and compounded this inequality
between White and Black patients.48 The study examined racial bias in predictive
health risk assessment scores, which health networks and insurers frequently use
to identify patients that require additional care for better health outcomes and
lower overall future expenditures. This study found that, comparatively, Black
patients had more comorbidities than White patients, which should have resulted
in increased interventions for this patient population, on average. Yet the
algorithm incorporated bias by predicting these scores using patient-level
healthcare costs rather than actual illness, without considering additional
barriers to care for Black patients.
These sources of bias and the above examples of AI applications that have
introduced, perpetuated, or exacerbated bias have resulted in discrimination, or
may have resulted in discrimination if they were introduced into clinical practice,
causing preventable risks to dignity and, in some cases, risks to patient access,
health, and safety.
However, having raised concerns about algorithmic and data bias, it is
important to underscore that appropriate incorporation into AI of data based on
personal characteristics (such as sex, gender identity, race, and age) is both
justifiable and essential for healthcare-related AI to serve all patients.49 Consider,
46

47
48

Sara G Murray, Robert M Wachter & Russell J Cucina, “Discrimination by Artificial
Intelligence in a Commercial Electronic Health Record — a Case Study” (2020) 10
Health Affairs Blog.
See Obermeyer, ‘‘Dissecting Racial Bias”, supra note 44.
Ibid. at 449-51.
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for example, physiological or clinically meaningful differences between genders,
such as known differences in response to cardiovascular treatments or differences
in autism spectrum disorder symptomology between men and women.50 In
considering how best to prevent biased algorithms that result in unwarranted
discrimination from a regulatory perspective, we must allow that AI applications
should track clinically relevant connections between sensitive characteristics and
appropriate care. The key, therefore, is for an AI application in healthcare to
track sensitive characteristics where this is warranted and to thwart attempts to
track these characteristics where it is not.51 This generally requires significant
interdisciplinary input into the algorithm’s development (e.g., clinical, socioeconomic, and epidemiological, to prompt the algorithm to distinguish between
undesirable bias and distinctions that are clinically relevant)52 and large amounts
of representative and feature-rich data (i.e., of the intended or likely users).
As noted, many of these issues already plague human decision-making. But a
single AI application in healthcare will have extended reach; it will be subject to a
degree of automation complacency, and practitioners or other decision-makers
may not always understand its underlying reasoning. 53 Further, such
applications often advertently or inadvertently replace multiple human
decision-makers, which may enable them to perpetuate or exacerbate bias at a
greater frequency and magnitude compared to the status quo.
Even where developers design AI applications under ethical frameworks to
reduce bias from methodological choices during an AI application’s
development, and where interdisciplinary teams account for and prompt an
algorithm to distinguish between undesirable bias and distinctions that are
clinically relevant, accurate and high-quality AI applications in healthcare may
still be limited by non-representative (including incomplete) data. Ultimately, no
amount of regulatory oversight or manipulation of data will correct for the basic
problem of incomplete and non-representative data. This points to some
fundamental questions, addressed in the next section: Why are so many AI
applications in healthcare trained on non-representative data, and why are those
sources non-representative in the first place?
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See Cirillo, supra note 28 at 2.
Ibid. at 4.
We acknowledge that this distinction is not always clear. Whether the tracking of
characteristics by a healthcare-related AI application is inappropriate or clinically
relevant will depend on several contextual factors. The hope is that interdisciplinary
teams can develop algorithms that produce as close to objective outputs as possible. In
many cases, however, this may be difficult to assess as current clinical care — AI’s
comparator or standard against which it is generally assessed — is often itself biased.
See Cirillo, supra note 28 at 7.
See Pasquale, supra note 15.
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3. DATA DATA EVERYWHERE?
Most AI applications in healthcare are developed using data sets not
primarily generated for AI research and development.54 Sources often include
electronic health records, healthcare utilization data, and biomedical research,
which may be incomplete or non-representative due to data governance or
systemic data issues, increasing the risk of healthcare-related AI bias resulting in
discrimination.

(a) Data Governance
Researchers and developers often access healthcare data sets through
secondary-use research frameworks, which generally focus on, among other
protections, minimizing the scope of data shared between the data steward and
the researcher, rather than protecting patients while enabling broader access.55
The outdated ethos of minimizing data sharing is an obstacle to developing
accurate and high-quality AI applications in healthcare — it belies the principle
that more data will result in less biased and more accurate algorithms.56 A
different approach to data governance could liberate the collection, use, and
disclosure of such data while engaging stronger accompanying protections
against and penalties for inappropriate uses and the re-identification of deidentified data, which would allow for more exploratory uses and healthcare
innovation while protecting patient privacy.57
Further, even though patient consent is generally not required under
secondary-use frameworks across Canada if the data is de-identified, 58 barriers
continue to exist when accessing such data. Privacy laws and their interpretation
across Canadian provinces and territories vary to a degree.59 Data stewards’
interpretations of privacy laws may also be overly cautious (i.e., erring on the
side of restricting access) to ensure their actions remain lawful.60 Further,
accessing high quality data can be challenging because different data stewards
exist within jurisdictions, data standardization is inconsistent between
54
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See Melissa D McCradden, Elizabeth A Stephenson & James A Anderson “Clinical
Research Underlies Ethical Integration of Healthcare Artificial Intelligence” (2020) 26:9
Nature Medicine 1325 at 1325 [McCradden].
Ibid.
See Gerke, supra note 11 at 302.
See generally OECD, OECD Health Policy Studies, Health Data Governance: Privacy,
Monitoring and Research (Paris: OECD, 2015) [OECD].
See Council of Canadian Academies, ‘‘Accessing Health and Health-Related Data in
Canada: The Expert Panel on Timely Access to Health and Social Data for Health
Research and Health System Innovation” (2015) at 80 [CCA].
Ibid. at 30, 79, 135. See also Parminder S Raina et al, “Accessing Health Care Utilization
Databases for Health Research: A Canadian Longitudinal Study on Aging Feasibility
Study” 28:3 Can J on Aging 287 at 293 [Raina].
See CCA, supra note 58 at 30.
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jurisdictions,61 special considerations exist for certain populations, 62 and the
process to obtain data may be lengthy, complex,63 and, therefore, costly.64 A
researcher seeking data from multiple provinces would have to comply with each
province’s requirements, and the data may still not be fully interoperable. Multijurisdictional data would better enable pan-Canadian AI applications, as it
would not be specific to any one province’s statistical distribution. Yet, while
multi-jurisdictional portals are being developed, 65 interoperability challenges and
incomplete data issues persist. A further question, and one outside the scope of
this article, is if patients’ data is being used to develop AI applications by
commercial entities, are they entitled to some of the benefits? 66
Within a province, such as Ontario, a researcher must apply to a data
custodian for access to patient data, which must be accompanied by a research
plan and research ethics board approval.67 The Personal Health Information
Protection Act, 2004 also requires research ethics boards to consider relevant
matters, including adequate privacy safeguards and the preservation of
confidentiality,68 and it requires the researcher to enter into a data sharing
agreement with the data custodian69 and to comply with any terms and
61
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63
64
65
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69

See ibid. at 59.
Including cultural sensitivities, as well as additional legal requirements when accessing
Indigenous peoples’ health care data. See, for example, culturally sensitive ethical datagathering frameworks, such as the Black Data Governance Framework: Black Health
Equity Working Group, ‘‘Engagement, Governance, Access, and Protection (EGAP): A
Data Governance Framework for Health Data Collected from Black Communities”
(2021), online (pdf): Black Health Equity Working Group <blackhealthequity.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2021/03/Report_EGAP_framework.pdf>. Further, accessing Indigenous health data transcends Western ‘‘privacy” rights and requires unique governance
frameworks, in accordance with Canadian and international law, as a necessary
component of self-determination. Through these frameworks, a person seeking to collect
or use Indigenous health data will have to work closely with the specific Indigenous
community and its leaders. See First Nations Health Authority, the British Columbia
Ministry of Health, and Indigenous Services Canada, ‘‘Data and Information
Governance: Case Study Report” (2019) at 6, online (pdf): First Nations Health
Authority, the British Columbia Ministry of Health, and Indigenous Services Canada
<www.fnha.ca/Documents/FNHA-BC-Tripartite-Agreement-Case-Study-Data-andInformation-Governance.pdf>.
Raina, supra note 59 at 291-93.
See generally CCA, supra note 58.
See e.g. the Health Data Research Network’s Data Access Support Hub (DASH):
<www.hdrn.ca/en/dash>, which aggregates harmonized data from multiple provincial
and national sources for distributed analytics.
Jacob L Jaremko et al, “Canadian Association of Radiologists White Paper on Ethical
and Legal Issues Related to Artificial Intelligence in Radiology” (2019) 70:2 Can Assoc
Radiologists J 107 at 113-14 [Jaremko].
Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004, SO 2004, c 3, Sched A, s 44 [PHIPA].
Ibid., s 44(3).
Ibid., s 44(5).
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restrictions set out in that agreement.70 This process by itself is not necessarily
problematic, but where data is sought from multiple jurisdictions, compliance
may become challenging. Regarding standardization, Canadian jurisdictions
have a long history with challenges in adopting and implementing interoperable
and consistent electronic health records.71 Inconsistently structured health
records exacerbate already subjective, unstructured information with a high
propensity to capture bias.72
Further, there has been a shift towards collecting and aggregating more deidentified personal health information. However, governance in some areas, such
as sensitive primary care settings, remains less clear. For example, healthcare
providers, as data custodians, may be reluctant to release especially sensitive
primary care records, even if de-identified. In response, some countries are
implementing ‘‘opt out” structures, presuming patient consent. 73 While this
model raises classic ‘‘ownership“ issues, it also challenges common law privacy
rights of intrusion upon seclusion74 into patients’ sensitive information, as
methods of re-identification become more advanced. And in certain areas, such
as radiology, inadequately processed digital imaging can easily be re-identified. 75
Most provinces do prohibit the improper use of personal health data, which
would include re-identifying individuals. Recently, Ontario76 enacted a new
statutory provision explicitly prohibiting the re-identifying of de-identified
personal health data,77 with fines of up to $200,000 or imprisonment for up to
one year for natural persons and up to $1,000,000 for any non-natural persons.78
However, a conviction requires the requisite mens rea (i.e., a wilful
contravention), so this type of provision may not be sufficient to deal with
70
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Ibid., s 44(6).
See generally Feng Chang & Nishi Gupta, “Progress in Electronic Medical Record
Adoption in Canada” (2015) 61:12 Can Family Physician 1076; see also Amanda L Terry
et al, “Gaps in Primary Healthcare Electronic Medical Record Research and Knowledge: Findings of a Pan-Canadian study” (2014) 10:1 Healthcare Policy 46.
See Irene Y Chen, Peter Szolovits & Marzyeh Ghassemi, “Can AI Help Reduce
Disparities in General Medical and Mental Health Care?” (2019) 21:2 AMA J Ethics 167.
See Madhumita Murgia, ‘‘England’s NHS Plans to Share Patient Records with Third
Parties” (26 May 2021), online: Financial Times <www.ft.com/content/9fee812f-697549ce-915c-aeb25d3dd748> [Murgia].
See Oliveira v. Aviva Canada Inc., 2018 ONCA 321, 2018 CarswellOnt 4855 (Ont. C.A.),
affirming Oliveira v. Aviva Canada Inc. et al, 2017 ONSC 6161, 2017 CarswellOnt 16264
(Ont. S.C.J.).
Jaremko, supra note 66 at 112.
Much of the discussion in Parts V and VIII regarding privacy and data governance
legislation and initiatives primarily relates to Ontario; while we recognize that this is an
Ontario-centric approach, Ontario is leading much of the law reform in this area in
Canada.
PHIPA, supra note 67, s 11.2 [amended by SO 2019, c 15, Sched 30, s 3].
PHIPHA, supra note 67, s 72(1)(b.1) [enacted by SO 2019, c 15, Sched 30, s 7]; PHIPHA,
supra note 67, ss 72(2)(a)-(b) [amended by SO 2020, c 5, Sched 6, s 23].
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failures to implement best practices in AI design.79 Further, public sector
legislation, such as that in Ontario, also prohibits persons or entities, including
inter- and extra-ministerial data integration units or ministries, from using or
attempting to use information that has been de-identified in accordance with the
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.80 However, the fines for a
wilful breach of this prohibition, upon conviction, are very low, not exceeding
$5,000.81

(b) Data Gaps
As discussed in Part III, even when developers can access large data sets,
these may be non-representative or incomplete. For example, Canadian
administrative data typically has limited race and ethnicity data.82 Even where
this data does exist it may be inconsistent. For example, a healthcare provider
may use country of origin or religion to infer race or ethnicity, if they record it at
all. Further, healthcare providers may discriminatorily misclassify patient
interactions with the health system. For example, they may dismiss the
concerns of Indigenous persons, inappropriately classifying an emergency
room visit as alcohol abuse, as was the case with Brian Sinclair and many
other Indigenous persons since.83
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Ontario also recently enacted provisions enabling the Commissioner to impose
administrative monetary penalties to encourage compliance with the Personal Health
Information Protection Act, 2004 and its regulations or to ‘‘[prevent] a person from
deriving, directly or indirectly, any economic benefit as a result of a contravention of [the]
Act or its regulations.” See PHIPA, supra note 67, s 61.1 [enacted by SO 2020, c 5, Sched
6, s 17].
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSO 1990, c F.31, s 49.8 [FIPPA]
[enacted by SO 2019, c 7, Sched 31, s 6.)
Ibid., s 61(1)(b.1) [enacted by SO 2019, c 7, Sched 31, s 8]; ibi.d , s 61(2).
The COVID-19 pandemic brought significant attention to this issue. See Kwame
McKenzie, “Socio-Demographic Data Collection and Equity in COVID-19 in Toronto”
(2021) 34 EClinicalMedicine; see also Emily Thompson et al, “COVID-19: A Case for the
Collection of Race Data in Canada and Abroad” (2021) 47 Canada Communicable
Disease Report 300. Further, the most recent federal budget, Budget 2021, included
funding to facilitate the collection of representative data: see Canada, Department of
Finance, Budget 2021 (Ottawa: Department of Finance Canada, 2021) at 230-31 [Budget
2021].
See Jane Gerster, ‘‘A man was ignored to death in an ER 10 years ago. It could happen
again”, Global News (21 September 2018), online: <globalnews.ca/news/4445582/briansinclair-health-care-racism/>; see also Darren Bernhardt, ‘‘Sick Indigenous elder
accused of being drunk at Winnipeg hospital, family says”, CBC News (16 October
2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/racism-health-care-hospital-winnipeg-1.5765103>; see also Rhianna Schmunk, ‘‘B.C. investigating allegations ER staff
played ‘game’ to guess blood-alcohol level of Indigenous patients”, CBC News (19 June
2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/racism-in-bc-healthcarehealth-minister-adrian-dix-1.5619245>.
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Those designing AI applications for healthcare must be able to ethically
access robust, diverse data to avoid overfitting84 smaller data sets that may be
non-representative or underfitting85 incomplete data sets: data must be better
collected from vulnerable and marginalized populations;86 biomedical research
must continue to increase its diversity; Canada needs standardized, multijurisdictional electronic data sources; and new approaches are needed for
collecting, using, and sharing health data that balance privacy risks and promote
sharing, with reinforced protections for patients. Trust, communication,
transparency, and safeguards will play a major role achieving such a goal.
Creating and enabling access to robust, representative data will require a
cooperative, whole-of-government approach at both the provincial and federal
level. Yet, as discussed, this raises one further key consideration: larger data sets,
or the use of multiple data sets, increases the risk of ‘‘data triangulation,” 87
which could lead to re-identification.88

4. CANADIAN EX POST LEGAL MECHANISMS ARE INSUFFICIENT
TO MITIGATE AI-RELATED DISCRIMINATION
An act of discrimination in a healthcare setting may ground a claim at
common law in negligence, under federal and provincial human rights legislation,
or under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms where the act involves government
action or a private entity, such as a hospital, implementing or furthering a
specific governmental policy or program.89 While these mechanisms play
important roles in deterring and compensating acts of discrimination, they
constitute reactive ‘‘wait and see” approaches where, beyond their deterrent
effects, the harms are likely to have already occurred. They also depend on a
potential claimant’s willingness to pursue such an action (and of course whether
84

85

86
87

88

89

Overfitting may occur where an AI application becomes highly trained and, therefore,
highly accurate for a specific patient subpopulation, all of whom are well represented in
the training data — so much so that the AI application is not generalizable to patients
underrepresented in the training data.
Underfitting may occur where a lack of data leads to insufficient training and an
inaccurate model for the specific patient subpopulation for whom the AI application is
being trained.
See Gerke, supra note 11 at 304.
Ibid. at 317; see also David Thesmar et al, “Combining the Power of Artificial
Intelligence with the Richness of Healthcare Claims Data: Opportunities and
Challenges” (2019) 37:6 PharmacoEconomics 745 at 749.
In Gordon v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2008 FC 258, 2008 CarswellNat 522, 2008
CarswellNat 6510 (F.C.) at para. 34 the Federal Court agreed with the Intervenor that
the test for identifying an individual (and, therefore, for anonymization) is where there is
‘‘a serious possibility that an individual could be identified through the use of [the]
information, alone or in combination with other available information.”
Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 1997 CarswellBC 1939, 1997
CarswellBC 1940, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.) at paras. 42-44.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN CANADIAN HEALTHCARE

491

they have the resources to do so), whether they are privy to the legal arrangement
or have standing, and whether they can meet evidentiary bars.
In the context of healthcare-related AI, negligence may give rise to
discrimination-based remedies. At common law, a person subject to
discrimination that causes injury (e.g., a failure to properly diagnose or
properly treat) may have a claim in negligence against the developer/
manufacturer, a healthcare institution, or a healthcare provider. The risk of
these kind of lawsuits may spur innovators to do their best not to bring biased
healthcare-related AI applications to market. However, the claimant bears the
evidentiary burden of proving that the defendant breached a standard of care,
where a duty of care exists, as well as factual and legal causation, which involve
significant time, resources, and risks — including judicial uncertainty. 90 Any
claimant will face difficulties in establishing a breach of a standard of care, as
well as factual and legal causation, where an algorithm is a “black box,” (i.e.,
where its processes and risks are opaque to a practitioner, facility, or, even, the
developer).91 Product liability claims involving computer software are already
challenging for claimants to establish:92 for negligent design claims, claimants
have to prove a defect in a software’s design, the presence of an unreasonable risk
for which a reasonable alternative design was available that would have reduced
or eliminated the risk at the time, as well as causation between that defect and the
claimant’s injury.93 In determining whether a reasonable alternative design
existed at the time, courts will consider the risk-utility test, 94 which involves a
number of factors — many of which require a significant understanding of the
specific technology and its industry. This would be especially challenging for
complex or state-of-the-art AI, AIML, and adaptive AIML applications.
A person subject to discrimination in a healthcare setting may also launch a
complaint under human rights legislation.95 However, human rights tribunals
90
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See Colleen M Flood & Bryan Thomas, ‘‘Canadian Medical Malpractice Law in 2011:
Missing the Mark on Patient Safety” (2011) 86:3 Chicago-Kent L Rev 1053 at 1068-72.
See Ian Kerr, Jason Millar & Noel Corriveau, “Robots and Artificial Intelligence in
Health Care” in Joanna Erdman, Vanessa Gruben & Erin Nelson, eds, Canadian Health
Law and Policy, 5th ed (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2017) 257 at 272.
See Jaremko, supra note 66 at 115.
See George R Wray, Max Jarvie & Samantha Bonanno, ‘‘Artificial Intelligence and
Product Liability: Catching up with the Future” (11 March 2021), online: BLG
<www.blg.com/en/insights/2021/03/artificial-intelligence-and-product-liability>; see
also Lisa R Lifshitz, ‘‘It’s hard to sue a robot: product liability considerations and AI in
Canada” (17 September 2018), online (blog): Canadian Lawyer <www.canadianlawyermag.com/news/opinion/its-hard-to-sue-a-robot-product-liability-considerationsand-ai-in-canada/275459>.
See Ragoonanan Estate v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2000 CarswellOnt 4613 (Ont.
S.C.J.) at para. 103.
For example, where an AI application discriminates in the provisions of services in
Ontario based on a prohibited ground listed in section 1 of the Ontario Human Rights
Code, RSO 1990, c H.19, the person may launch a claim under section 34 of the Code.
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often involve delays for claimants seeking redress (generally because the system is
backlogged due to insufficient resources),96 low success rates in finding systemic
discrimination,97 low damage awards,98 and evidentiary challenges.99 A claimant
bears the onus of establishing prima facie discrimination in, for example, the
denial of services based on a prohibited ground. They must establish that
discrimination was, more probably than not, a factor in the respondent’s
decision.100 While courts may rely on factual inferences and social context,
evidence must still be adduced that tangibly links discrimination based on a
prohibited ground to the alleged conduct.101 And claimants already face barriers;
depending on the strength of the inference, courts may not take judicial notice of
data indicating systemic discrimination — which an AI application may
exacerbate as an adverse effect — such as census data or general research
studies.102 Regardless, if an AI application in healthcare were to rely on a
sensitive attribute in making a decision without clinical justification, resulting in
potential discrimination, it remains uncertain as to what level of influence this
attribute must have on the AI application’s output to ground a claim of
discrimination. This uncertainty may arise in a situation where, for example, an
AI application denied a patient referral, admission, or the provision or funding
of care. Like negligence claims, it would be difficult for a claimant to prove that a
facility, person, or organization discriminated in the provision of services based
on a prohibited ground when using an AI application, especially where the
algorithm is a ‘‘black box.” Proper analysis of an algorithm’s training data,
development, and statistical analysis to generate sufficient evidence to ground a
96
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100
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The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, for example, had 345 active complaints as of
December 31, 2020. While the Tribunal experienced a net reduction in active complaints
in 2016 and 2017 (outstanding complaints plus new complaints less closed complaints), it
experienced net increases in active complaints in 2018, 2019, and 2020. See Canada,
Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, Annual Report 2020, online (pdf): <www.chrttcdp.gc.ca/transparency/AnnualReports/2020-ar/2020-ar-en.pdf>.
See Jean-Simon Schoenholz, “Opening the Doors of Justice: Group Litigation and
Claims of Systemic Discrimination” (2017) 48:2 Ottawa L Rev 687 at 713 [Schoenholz].
See Jeffrey Radnoff & Pamela Foy, “The Tort of Discrimination” (2002) 26 Advocates Q
309 at 314; see also Otto Ranalli & Bruce Ryder, “Undercompensating for Discrimination: An Empirical Study of General Damages Awards Issued by the Human Rights
Tribunal of Ontario, 2000-2015” (2017) 13 JL & Equity 91 at 102-19.
See Schoenholz, supra note 97 at 702.
See Pieters v. Peel Law Assn., 2013 ONCA 396, 2013 CarswellOnt 7881 (Ont. C.A.) at
para. 83.
See Colleen Sheppard & Mary Louise Chabot, ‘‘Obstacles to Crossing the Discrimination Threshold: Connecting Individual Exclusion to Group-Based Inequalities” (2018)
96:1 Can Bar Rev 1 at 14-28 [Sheppard]. See also Que´bec (Commission des droits de la
personne et des droits de la jeunesse) c. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Ae´ronautique Centre
de formation), 2015 SCC 39, 2015 CarswellQue 6297, 2015 CarswellQue 6298 (S.C.C.) at
para. 88.
See Sheppard, supra note 101 at 30. See also Kahkewistahaw First Nation v. Taypotat,
2015 SCC 30, 2015 CarswellNat 1585, 2015 CarswellNat 1586 (S.C.C.) at para. 31.
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successful claim may be an insurmountable task. Further, the availability of
some of this information may be limited by private contracts, such as the terms
within data sharing agreements.103
Discrimination claims under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms are also
unlikely to provide claimants with sufficient redress. Like claims in negligence,
section 15 equality claims require significant time and resources to litigate.
Further, the claimant risks no redress or further loss (e.g., incurred costs), and
they face significant evidentiary hurdles in proving a prima facie infringement.104
And, again, evidentiary challenges would compound where an algorithm is a
‘‘black box.”
As can be seen, then, ex-post legal mechanisms have significant limitations as
the black box problem will make it difficult for plaintiffs to prove discrimination
or negligence. Further, the barriers in accessing ex post facto justice to remedy
AI-based discrimination would compound systemic bias and discrimination
against many marginalized groups.

5. THE EXISTING EX ANTE LEGAL LANDSCAPE IN CANADA IS
EVOLVING, BUT GAPS STILL PERSIST
In addition to laws that may provide a remedy after an injury has occurred,
and which operate to deter the conduct leading to those harms, other laws
attempt to directly regulate behaviour to prevent injuries before a harm occurs
(ex ante laws). The existing ex ante landscape in Canada consists of a patchwork
of federal and provincial laws and policies that are not tailored specifically to AI.
While provinces have traditionally had jurisdiction over healthcare delivery, the
Supreme Court of Canada has held that ‘‘health“ is an amorphous topic subject
to overlapping jurisdiction depending on the scope of the legislation. 105 The
complexity and reach of AI in healthcare means that most AI applications will
be, directly or indirectly, subject to a web of federal and provincial legislation
and institutional policies and practices.
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Consider, for example, where a data custodian shares health data with a researcher under
an agreement that explicitly prohibits the disclosure of data to any other party.
See Ewert v. Canada, 2018 SCC 30, 2018 CarswellNat 2804, 2018 CarswellNat 2805
(S.C.C.) at para. 79, where a plaintiff’s section 15 claim that an actuarial assessment tool
used by Correctional Services Canada was discriminatory, based on an increased risk of
inaccuracy when used for Indigenous persons compared to non-Indigenous persons, was
dismissed. The Court noted that a mere increase in the risk of a tool’s inaccuracy for a
specific group is insufficient to constitute discrimination, and that a claimant would have
to prove that the tool in fact overestimates (or underestimates) risk leading to a different
outcome for the specific group.
See RJR-Macdonald Inc. c. Canada (Procureur ge´ne´ral), 1995 CarswellQue 119, 1995
CarswellQue 119F, (sub nom. RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General))
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.) at para. 32, citing Schneider v. British Columbia, 1982
CarswellBC 241, 1982 CarswellBC 741, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 112 (S.C.C.) at 141-142 [S.C.R.].
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Provincially, self-regulating entities, such as the College of Physicians and
Surgeons of Ontario, establish licensing requirements and processes for
membership therein, as well as ethical codes of conduct by which their
members must abide. As a form of indirect ex ante regulation for the safe use
of AI applications in healthcare, self-regulating (health practitioner) colleges
could require a certain degree of digital health literacy as a fundamental
competency within their licensing frameworks. 106 In addition, a myriad of
provincial laws regulate public and private healthcare facilities. However, the
direct ex ante regulation of many AI applications in healthcare falls within
federal jurisdiction. The scope of this jurisdiction, and the extent to which it is
relied upon in federal laws, dictates whether certain AI applications fall within
Health Canada’s ex ante oversight.
Federally, the Food and Drugs Act107 (the Act) and the subordinate Medical
Devices Regulations108 (the Regulations), enacted under Parliament’s criminal
law power,109 prohibit the selling of unsafe medical devices,110 as well as the
selling, labelling, packaging, treating, processing, and advertising of deceptive
devices.111 The Regulations further prohibit a person from selling or importing a
medical device unless the following conditions are met: the manufacturer
complies with the established ex ante product licensing scheme;112 the person, if
they are not the manufacturer, complies with the ex ante establishment licensing
scheme;113 the person complies with the Regulations’ labelling requirements 114
and various post-market requirements as conditions of the licensing schemes.
The existing ex ante product licensing scheme requires a manufacturer to submit,
among other things, information demonstrating a medical device’s safety and
effectiveness (i.e., that it meets sections 10 to 20 of the Regulations) as a
precondition for Health Canada to authorize the sale and importation of that
device.115 Historically, post-market requirements have included mandatory
incident reporting by manufacturers and importers, who rely on voluntary
reporting from patients, practitioners, and other persons. However, recent
106

107
108
109

110
111
112

113

114
115

See Task Force, supra note 1 at 30, where the Task Force recommends digital health
literacy as a fundamental competency in physician training.
Food and Drugs Act, RSC 1985, c F-27 [FDA].
Ibid.; Medical Devices Regulations, SOR /98-282 [MDR].
Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 91(27), reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix
II, No 5.
See FDA, supra note 107, s 19.
Ibid., s. 20.
See MDR, supra note 108, ss 26-42. Except for Class I medical devices, which are still
subject to, inter alia, quality standards prescribed by sections 10 to 20 of the Regulations.
See MDR, supra note 108, ss 44-51.1. Establishment licences are generally required for
persons selling or importing medical devices who are not the manufacturer and who do
not possess a medical device licence; exceptions are set out in subsection 44(2).
Ibid., ss 21-23.
See MDR, supra note 108, ss 32(2)(c), 32(3)(f), and 32(4)(i).
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amendments to the Regulations require hospitals to report serious incidents 116
and authorization holders to report serious risks identified in foreign
jurisdictions,117 and they also enable the Minister to order an authorization
holder to gather and submit information where other regulatory requirements
are insufficient to manage significant uncertainties118 — a shift towards more onmarket oversight, or a ‘‘life-cycle” approach to regulation.
Importantly, the Act and the Regulations only capture medical devices that
meet the definition of ‘‘device” in section 2 of the Act, 119 and the Regulations
only prohibit the importing, advertising, and sale120 of medical devices, unless
the manufacturer holds a licence in respect of a medical device. 121 The definition
of a device in the Act includes any of its components or accessories, and it
captures devices intended to diagnose, treat, mitigate, or prevent a disease,
disorder, or abnormal physical state or to restore, modify, or correct the body
structure or the functioning of any body part. Health Canada currently interprets
this definition to exclude from its oversight AI applications that merely relate
symptoms and test results to best practices, or AI applications that support
practitioner decision-making but stop short of near-term diagnosing or
treating.122 The Act and the Regulations do not contain any AI-specific
provisions; however, ‘‘device” captures medical devices (hardware) with software
and ‘‘software as a medical device,” even if it is not associated with any
hardware.123 The Regulations provide a general ex ante safety and effectiveness
framework, including for many AI and AIML-containing medical devices, but
the rigidity of the rules presently seem to preclude the approval of adaptive
AIML applications that continuously learn and change.124 At the time of this
writing, Health Canada has not yet approved any adaptive AIML applications
116
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See FDA, supra note 107, s 21.8 [enacted by SC 2014, c 24, s 5]; see also MDR, supra note
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required by section 20 of the Medical Devices Regulations), nor would a manufacturer
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— but the question remains, should they approve such applications, and how
should they approach the challenge of regulating technology which will change
over time? It should also be noted that the definition of ‘‘sell” in the Act was
recently extended to include any lease arrangement, 125 which has important
implications for AI because software is not always sold (distributed), but
sometimes is leased. However, more importantly, because the prohibitions in the
Regulations are on the ‘‘sale” of a medical device, there is presently no
prohibition on practitioners’ developing adaptive AIML applications in-house
and using them on their patients, absent any kind of selling, including
distributing or leasing, or conducting a ‘‘clinical trial” involving human
subjects.126
In 2019, the Act was amended, providing for an Advanced Therapeutic
Products (ATP) pathway. 127 An ‘‘advanced therapeutic product” is a
‘‘therapeutic product” or ‘‘class of therapeutic products” described in Schedule
G of the Act — to which, or from which, the Minister may add or remove ATPs
or classes of ATPs by order.128 Overall, if leveraged, the pathway would provide
regulatory oversight for healthcare-related adaptive AIML that meets the
definition of ‘‘device,”129 but it would also allow for considerably more
discretion for the regulator in how to treat new and novel technologies seeking
licensure.130 Health Canada is now considering the use of the ATP pathway to
create a regulatory pathway for adaptive AIML, the prohibitions of which would
extend beyond sale or lease and would include, for example, the manufacture or
testing of an adaptive diagnostic imaging AIML application for use 131 within a
particular hospital for its own purposes.
Health Canada could use the ATP pathway (or medical device licensing
requirements more broadly) to help address (some) problems of algorithmic bias.
For example, it could require as part of the licensing process evidence from
innovators as to the representativeness and appropriateness of the training data.
However, given the difficulties AI innovators have in accessing data that we
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highlighted earlier, it may not always be possible to demand of innovators that
training data be representative. In these circumstances Health Canada could
consider the use of advisory product labels for healthcare providers, warning
them of this risk. This is of course far from a perfect solution but will at least put
the issue squarely before the healthcare professional rather than leaving them to
assume that the AI innovation must be safe/appropriate for all patients because
it has been licensed.
More generally, Health Canada is considering how best to further move
towards a life-cycle approach for regulation, monitoring medical devices in the
real world through, for example, the imposition of terms and conditions on
medical device licences, which may obligate licence holders to submit certain
information periodically.132 This is of course essential if it is to provide
regulatory oversight of adaptive AIML, which by its very definition is designed
to evolve over time. A life-cycle approach provides a platform for Health Canada
to collect and respond to evidence of algorithmic bias from real-world
experience, at least bias that results in safety concerns for patients. Again, we
do not wish to convey this is a perfect solution, as it may be difficult for providers
and patients to detect and, therefore, report problems of algorithmic bias with
non-adaptive or adaptive AIML applications. In this regard, the regulator may
find help for post-market oversight from employing its own secondary software
or algorithms where data could be aggregated and analyzed in near real time.
We also note the need for coordination by federal and provincial
governments with efforts made at the federal level to regulate to prevent
algorithmic bias in healthcare-related AI. Health Canada’s jurisdictional
authority would not protect against bias and discrimination among AI
applications in healthcare that harm dignity without compromising safety, nor
would it cover AI applications in healthcare that fall outside of Health Canada’s
purview, such as patient scheduling applications, system-level insight or pattern
recognition applications, or insurer risk-assessment applications. The provinces
and territories may have to address these issues, in some capacity, by
modernizing various statutes and regulations — both ex post and possibly
novel ex ante legal mechanisms — to better protect people from AI-related bias
and possible discrimination in healthcare and in private healthcare-related
contractual settings.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS AND NEXT STEPS
Accurate and high-quality AI applications in healthcare require: (1) robust,
complete, and representative training data wherever possible; (2) algorithms that
132
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do not enable or support bias on the basis of arbitrary traits, such as race and
sex, with no clinical, moral or legal justification; and (3) strong development
standards to protect against bias throughout the entire lifecycle of an AI
application (i.e., the application’s conception, design, and implementation, with
appropriate feedback mechanisms at each stage). To achieve these objectives,
governments and innovators should take several steps.

(a) Federal Safety Regulation of Algorithmic Bias
Due to the pervasiveness and potential effects of algorithmic and data biases
— such as inaccurate predictions or interventions — Health Canada should treat
potential bias in healthcare-related AI applications as a safety issue. 133
Regulators should require as part of licensure the disclosure of an algorithm’s
training data, objective function, and prediction methodology, 134 as well as
specific analysis as to the representativeness of an AI application’s training data.
Where developers are unable to access robust, complete, and representative
training data, they should demonstrate serious due diligence in trying to access
such data before relying on synthetic approaches to fill any such gaps.
Consideration could be given to requiring algorithmic audits from certified
third parties as a precondition for approval, with or without the assignment of a
performance classification, which should include its risk of bias, and which
should appear on the product label. Where disclosure regarding the AIML’s
algorithm (e.g., a ‘‘black-box“) or its data sources is not possible, Health Canada
could rely on established clinical research ethics frameworks (i.e., clinical trials)
to fill certain evidentiary gaps.135
Where there are algorithmic or related data bias risks, Health Canada should
consider providing warnings as to the risks of unreflective application by a
healthcare professional of healthcare-related AI to an at-risk population. Our
suggestion for product label warnings would we hope nudge developers to
critically examine the representativeness of an AI application’s training data and
the fairness of an algorithm itself. However, if too liberally employed, such
warnings could become largely meaningless and provide developers with an
‘‘out” to download responsibility and liability for off-label use on practitioners
or facilities.
Movements towards a lifecycle regulatory approach, essential for
appropriate governance of adaptive AIML, also offers the prospect of
collecting better real-world data and opportunities to identify and respond to
manifestations of algorithmic bias. We do not discount the enormous regulatory
challenge here of requiring a highly iterative lifecycle ‘‘validation” process, 136 or
133
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even the need for use by the regulator of secondary software to monitor
continuous statistical outcome metrics, flag issues, and monitor safety-related
bias and other safety and efficacy issues.
Overall, by viewing bias as a safety concern, Health Canada should push
innovators to use robust, complete, and representative training data and to
establish strong internal frameworks for developer-led bias analysis.

(b) Provincial and Additional Federal Mechanisms to Mitigate Bias
In addition to incorporating digital literacy into practitioner licensing and
competency frameworks, practitioners should familiarize themselves with any
available audits of AI applications they intend to use in their practice. Further,
hospitals and other purchasers should require and review such audits in advance
of purchasing and reimbursement decisions. For any healthcare-related AI
application that falls outside of Health Canada’s purview, payers or users should
demand robust third-party analysis of the algorithm and its training data.
Certification standards and third-party audits could be leveraged for AI devices
and applications that fall within or outside of Health Canada’s jurisdiction.
Provincial governments, as well as the federal government, should also
modernize discrimination-based human rights legislation to better remedy AIrelated bias and its resulting harms, especially where complex algorithms,
including ‘‘black box” algorithms and adaptive AIML, will pose additional
evidentiary hurdles for such claims. However, modernized legislation should be
accompanied by significant government funding increases into already
underfunded human rights commissions and agencies. Such funding increases
could modernize oversight, including for research and advice functions.
Provincial and federal governments should also clearly articulate best deidentification practices and support organizations seeking to develop such
practices.137
Recently, Ontario released a White Paper inviting consultation on its plans
to introduce a new private sector data protection law for Ontario. The White
Paper specifically addresses automated decision systems. It indicates that one
option is to ‘‘prohibit the use of AI and automated decision-making systems
when they could cause harm to citizens.”138 It also indicates that a goal of
reforms could be ‘‘to inform Ontarians when and how their data is used by these
technologies, and empower them with a right to object to these uses, or at least to
contest them.”139 Quebec’s Act to modernize legislative provisions as regards the
protection of personal information,140 which has reformed that province’s public
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and private sector data protection laws, also includes certain rights with respect
to automated decision systems, including a version of a right to an explanation of
the decisional system. It also provides a right to submit observations to someone
within the organization who is in a position to review the decision, although it
stops short of an actual right to demand that the decision be reviewed by a
human. Bill C-11,1410 the federal bill to reform Canada’s private sector data
protection law also provided for a right to an explanation of automated decision
systems, including a right to be informed of how the data used to make the
decision was obtained. It should be noted that the concept of a decision in Bill C11 was quite broad and included ‘‘any technology that assists or replaces the
judgment of human decision-makers using techniques such as rules-based
systems, regression analysis, predictive analytics, machine learning, deep learning
and neural nets.”142 Although these are examples of actual or proposed reforms
to private sector data protection laws, and not personal health information
protection laws, they do demonstrate the extent to which rights to an explanation
of automated decision-systems may become a key part of data protection
legislation not just in the private sector but in the public and health sectors as
well.
Finally, we note the possibility of the Federal government using its criminal
law powers to provide penalties for discrimination resulting from biased
healthcare-related AI products (or indeed more broadly).143 Such a proposal
obviously requires an in-depth treatment of division of powers questions as well
as a deeper interrogation of the interaction of such a law with other provincial
and territorial laws and policies (including the recent initiatives underway in
Ontario and Quebec), and we plan to address this possibility in a sibling paper.

(c) Innovators: Transparency & Trust
Regardless of specific regulatory requirements, innovators — best positioned
to mitigate algorithmic bias — should publicly disclose the kinds of training data
they use, any real and potential gaps in data, and actual or potential bias of an
AI application.144 Innovators should also include highly interdisciplinary teams
in the development of an algorithm, to strive to discern between, and prompt an
140
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algorithm to recognize, undesirable bias and distinctions that are clinically
relevant. Innovators must also maintain rigorous internal development processes
that include ongoing audits and checks for algorithmic bias.145 Such testing must
be conducted using sensitive-feature comparator groups.146 But, again, this
would require sufficient representative data for these groups, including the
sensitive feature or patient trait in question.
Innovators will bear a high degree of moral responsible over the next few
decades of AI development and implementation. Further breaches of the public’s
confidence, in the context of AI in healthcare, could significantly undermine the
gathering and accessibility of robust, representative, and complete data. And
high-profile safety issues, which may arise from algorithmic bias, could create
major barriers for the development and implementation of AI applications in
healthcare, potentially through strict, reactive regulations by both federal and
provincial governments.

(d) Addressing Non-Representative Data and the Inaccessibility of Large,
Diverse Data Sets
In order to ensure that there is sufficient high-quality data for AI innovation
in healthcare, provincial and federal governments must implement new
mechanisms to incentivize the generation and aggregation of health data for
sharing purposes. Without effective data gathering and sharing mechanisms,
Canada will fall behind other nations. Patients will not realize the benefits of AI
applications in healthcare, they will be more likely to suffer additional biasrelated harms, and Canada’s overall economic prosperity will also suffer. While
many significant concerns have been raised regarding the collecting of race-based
data,147 if we do not collect this type of data, we risk allowing bias and its harms
to propagate in AI applications in healthcare, and we also risk limiting the
benefits to already inequitably advantaged individuals. There are some signs that
governments in Canada are beginning to address issues around access to high
quality data. The most recent federal budget, for example, allocated funding to
enhance the creation of data standards through the Standards Council of
Canada. It also contained money to establish the role of Data Commissioner. 148
Although the exact nature of this role remains unclear, it could be similar to
Australia’s Data Commissioner 149 or New Zealand’s Data Steward. 150
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Leadership of this kind to develop the appropriate frameworks for data sharing
would be invaluable.
The provinces should also act with respect to their own stores of data. In
Ontario, the government’s Digital Strategy151 signals the intention to create a
new Data Authority, which will be charged with ‘‘building modern data
infrastructure to support economic and social growth at scale, while ensuring
that data is private, secure, anonymous and cannot identify people
individually.”152 In addition, it seems likely that Ontario will build out its first
extra ministerial data integration unit, the Ontario Health Data Platform
(OHDP), giving it greater scope. The OHDP was created following amendments
to PHIPA during the COVID-19 crisis.153 It was built to serve as a data sharing
facility that could combine data from multiple sources, including health, public,
and private sectors. The OHDP may well see its mandate extended beyond the
pandemic as a new health data sharing infrastructure for the province. 154
Federal and provincial governments must also continue to work closely with
Indigenous governments and communities to advance ethical data sharing
structures that respect Indigenous data sovereignty and Indigenous communities’
privacy rights and cultural sensitivities. In doing so, governments must ensure
that AI applications in healthcare developed from such data specifically benefit
Indigenous communities, especially those that elect to share their health data —
reciprocity is key. Governments should also continue to develop ethical data
governance frameworks for other culturally sensitive populations.
If governments consider more proactive approaches in gathering and
releasing large healthcare data sets for AI development, including for
commercial use, 155 they should also consider enhanced protections for
patients. Federal and provincial privacy legislation could provide additional
protections for patients by explicitly prohibiting the re-identification of
healthcare data and backing such a prohibition with significant fines and
penalties, where legislatures and governments have not already done so. 156
Governments could also leverage public-private partnerships, and greater
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federal-provincial-territorial cooperation on standards, 1 5 7 access,
interoperability, etc., to build large databases for AI development, in a
transparent manner, to build trust while providing assurances or some public
commitment regarding the benefits of any resulting AI applications.

CONCLUSION
In this article we have considered the problems of bias and the discrimination
that can result from healthcare-related AI. These are complex problems that
range from flaws in algorithm design to problems of insufficient or deficient data.
We have explained how these problems of bias can arise, and how they might
result in discriminatory treatment or exacerbate existing discrimination within
the healthcare system. Yet AI applications in healthcare will continue to
advance, and we must take advantage of their significant benefits. To drive the
ethical development of AI applications in healthcare, to minimize harms, and to
ensure the just distribution of their benefits, we must respond to these many
significant problems through broad, multi-dimensional, concerted approaches.
An important solution at the federal and provincial level involves ensuring
that innovators have access to high quality, robust, and representative data sets.
We have highlighted some of the existing challenges with access to data within
the Canadian healthcare system, as well as some of the initiatives underway to
address these deficiencies. Much work remains to be done in this area, as
initiatives are currently in the very early stages, and they only exist in some
jurisdictions and not others (leading to further fragmentation). Solutions
involving access to data must take into account privacy considerations, as well
as those relating to Indigenous data sovereignty. In Canada, fragmented
jurisdiction over healthcare issues combined with a history of poor crossjurisdictional standardization has created a context in which the available data
are often difficult to access and poorly interoperable. Much work needs to be
done to enhance data quality, data interoperability, and access to high-quality
data through innovative data sharing frameworks.
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We have also looked at existing legal frameworks for ex post and ex ante
responses to bias and discrimination in AI applications in healthcare. Ex post
mechanisms are frequently unsatisfactory because they activate only after harm
has occurred, and they require considerable effort and resources on the part of
individuals who have suffered harms. Further, litigating algorithmic bias and
discrimination will be challenging because of causation problems and difficulties
in accessing algorithms and their training data. In our view, ex ante solutions
(ones that prevent the harm) are more promising than ex post mechanisms, both
for patients and innovators. However, they will require existing laws (such as
those regulating medical devices) to be better tailored to the AIML and adaptive
AIML context. A system for licensing healthcare-related AI should take into
account the problems of bias and discrimination in order to prevent these issues
from manifesting in the first place. Further, provinces may have to consider
novel ex ante approaches to prevent AI-based bias and discrimination in
healthcare for AI applications that that fall outside federal jurisdiction.
In some regards, Canada is well positioned to lead effective and equitable AI
development and implementation in healthcare, such as its expertise among AI
researchers and research institutions and its diverse society.158 However, in order
to do so, federal and provincial governments must take steps — ideally with
some degree of cooperation — to address the significant and intersecting
problems that we have identified. Properly developed AI applications have the
potential to mitigate extant bias and discrimination, but such development
requires intervention both to create optimal conditions for development and to
ensure, through a combination of regulation and recourse, that high expectations
are met. We cannot risk creating new sources of bias or perpetuating or
exacerbating extant, and often concealed, discrimination in healthcare.
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